



Pennsylvania State University 
Do human non-persons have basic rights 
simply because they are members of a species 
characterized by personhood? Are we justi-
fied if we give IIDral preference to human 
non-persons over non-human non-persons with 
equivalent mental capacities, provided that 
the latter do not belong to a species charac-
terized by personhood? Michael Wreen has 
argued for this speciesist view in his re-
cent, important article, "In Defense of Spe-
ciesism. "[ I] I have very recently argued 
that he fails to make a case for his view. [2] 
Now Wreen has forcefully rejected my criti-
cisms in his "My Kind of Person." [3] In the 
present article, I am pleased. to contribute 
another installment to the debate on species-
ism. This issue, which is central not only 
to anirral rights issues but also to ethics in 
general, certainly needs IIDre critical atten-
tion. Wreen is one of the very few Ibiloso-
Ibers who has put his keen fbilosofbical 
acumen to the task of defending a view taken 
for granted by virtually all humans. When 
the current round of argumentative dust has 
settled, however, I believe that the reader 
will agree that speciesism remains unjusti-
fied. 
Before proceeding further, I want to lay 
one of Wreen' s charges against me to rest. 
He thinks that I have overlooked half of his 
argument. According to his numbering, the 
argument for speciesism has four stages: (I) 
hllllllility and personhood are claimed to be 
linked conceptually, thus providing a "solid" 
basis for our ability to identify with human 
non-persons in a unique way; (2 and 3) becom-
ing and remaining a human person is subject 
to the laws of nature and chance, forces over 
which humans have little or no oontrol; and 
(4) human non-persons should be ascribed 
basic rights on the grounds of equality of 
opportunity or fairness (WI: p. 52). In my 
critique, I said that Wreen's argument oon-
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sisted of two major appeals: an appeal to 
metafhysics (or "quasi-metafbysics," to use 
his term) and an appeal to fairness. This is 
an "oversight," he says, which results in my 
"ooncentrating mainly [sic] on stages (1) and 
(4) (WII: p. 24). In fact, however, I omit-
ted no stage of Wreen' s argument in my cri-
tique. His (l)--which is really two steps 
(the conceptual point and the claim that this 
point supports our ability to identify with 
human ~un-pers6ns)--was discussed first as an 
"appeal to metafbysics." I then discussed 2-
4 under the heading of "an appeal to fair-
ness." (Incidentally, (2) is already in-
cluded in (3); I do not know why Wreen gave 
them two numbers, given the way they are 
stated. ) It is true that I spent much rrore 
time on his (I) and (4); they obviousI y are 
open to IIDre objection than the empirical 
claims in (2-3). [4] This does not indicate 
that I overlooked any part of his main argu-
ment, let alone half of it. However, I am 
happy to follow Wreen' s numbering here in 
. order to avoid any further misunderstanding. 
I will argue (as I did before, but with 
the benefit of Wreen' s recent responses) that 
the quasi-metafhysical, conceptual claim in 
(1) is not justified. Even if (1) succeeded, 
however, it-in oonjunction with the largely 
correct though overstated (2-3)--provides no 
support for speciesism without the crucial 
fairness claim in (4). I will show that 
claim to be unsuccessful on two oounts. 
First, let me consider (1 ) • Wreen' s 
main argument for the claim that "the oon-
cepts of a human being and a person are not 
related merely empirically" is his contention 
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that it is sUPPJrted by the following "plaus-
ible" identification principle:" 
(IP): It's a necessary truth that 
the statement "X is a live human 
being" is gcxxl evidence for the 
statement "X is a hUlMIl person... 
(WI: p. 50) [5] 
If (IP) is true, then being a live human is 
criteriologicall~--ratherthan empiric411y--
related to being a human person. 
Why should we accept (IP)? Because, 
according to Wreen, it is a "near relative" 
of another extremely plausible principle: 
(RI) [Re-identification Princi-
pleJ[6]: It is a necessary truth 
that bodily identity is evidence 
for personal identity. (WI: p. 50) 
In my critique, I charged (a) that Wreen did 
not provide a defense for (IP), since (RI) is 
relevant to a very different sense of "iden-
tification," and (b) that (IP) is quite im-
plausible in any case (p. 123). 
wreen responds to (a) that the relation-
ship between (RI) and (IP) is "obvious"--the 
latter is "conceptually prior" to the former: 
"For to deny (IP) while holding fast to the 
re-identification principle would be like 
accepting the principles of calculus while 
rejecting those of basic arithmetic" (WII: p. 
24). But does (RI) really presuppose (IP)? 
I think not. The bodily criterion of 
personal identity concerns the question of 
how we determine Whether person X is the ~ 
person we knew before: is this person still 
X, or is he/she another person altogether? 
(RI) does not tell us how to determine whe-
ther X is still ~ person. The identification 
which is genuinely conceptually prior to (RI) 
is the individuation of person X fran person 
Y in terms of bodily characteristics. Such 
individuation presupposes that one has al-
ready determined that X is a person. How ~ 
determines this is not specified. 
Here is how one could accept (RI) and 
the bodily individuation of persons it pre-
supposes without accepting (IP). One accepts 
Feinberg's notion of "cornronsense persons" (a 
notion accepted by Wreen on p. 47 of his 
original article): persons in this sense are 
"those beings who are conscious, have a con-
cept and awareness of themselves, are capable 
of experiencing emotion, can reason and ac-
quire understanding, can plan ahead, can act 
on their plans, and can feel pleasure or 
pain. " [7] Who counts as a person in this 
sense is an empirical question (assuming, as 
one is amply justified in doing, that logical 
behaviorism and its variants are false). X, 
let's say, has been determined to be a per-
son. HOI>' do we know that X is X rather than 
Y? Because X has a unique set of fOysical 
characteristics. We individuate X from Y in 
terms of these bodily characteristics. Like-
wise, after a lapse of time, we decide that 
the individual we are now confronting is 
probably the same X we confronted earlier 
provided that this individual has the body we 
previously determined to be X's. Let's sup-
pose that we cannot imagine circumstances in 
which bodily identity would not be gocxi evi-
dence for personal identity. Then we could 
accept (RI). But we need not at all believe 
that it is ~sarily true that "X is a live 
human being" is gcxxl evidence for "X is a 
human person." Whether X is a person or not 
is a purely empirical matter, we can hold, 
even though--~ ~ has been found to be ~ 
,Eerson---we may hold that the relationship 
between this particular ~ and this particular 
body is not purely empirical. In short, the 
follO\>'ing two questions are logically inde-
pendent: (1) "How do we determine if X is a 
person?" and (2) "How do we tell whether this 
is person X and not person Y?" (RI) concerns 
the second question; (IP) concerns the first. 
Thus, they are also logically independent. 
(RI) does not presuppose (IP). 
Moreover, my original second criticism 
of (IP), which I have here called criticism 
(b), still stands: since we can, with no 
difficulty whatever, conceive of circumstan-
ces in which "X is a live human bei~g" would 
not be gcxxl evidence for 'X is a hUlMIl per-
son, " the claim that this evidential rela-
tionship is necessC!EY must be false (Le., 
(IP) is false). Wreen responds by agreeing 
that we can imagine the evidential relation-
ship not to hold but denying that this shows 
that (IP) is false: 
All inductive principles, even the 
best of them, and ~ criteriolo-
gical principles, may have to give 
way to particular circumstances in 
the face of evidence to the contra-
ry. (WII: p. 24, emphasis added.) 
However, this won't do. It is part of 
the concept of "criterion" that if x is cri-
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teriologica.lly related to y, then there is no 
evidence that we would count as showing that 
x is not good evidence for y. '!'his is what 
distinguishes a criteriological claim from an 
empirical one. 'Ib quote Sidney Shoemaker, 
whose sense of "criterion" Wreen explicitly 
adopts in his response to me (WII: p. 24). 
A test of whether sanething is one 
of the criteria for the truth of 
joogments of a certain kind is 
whether it is conceivable that we 
tnight discover empirically that it 
is not, or has ceased to be, evi-
dence in favor of the truth of such 
joogments. [8] 
Thus, (IP) is false. It is at most empiri-
cally true that "X is a live hum:m being" is 
good evidence for "X is a hum:m person." 
Wreen has not shown that "the concepts of a 
hum:m being and a person are not related 
merely empirically." 
If (IP) is false, it cannot provide "a 
solid metafhysical basis" for the alleged 
fact that we identify with human non-persons 
in a way in which we cannot identify with 
non-human non-persons, as Wreen claims in the 
second Part of his stage (1 ) • '!'his is true 
regardless of how one interprets "X identi-
fies with Y."[9] 
Even if stage (1) had succeeded in its 
entirety, Wreen' s argument for speciesism 
would nevertheless, as I said earlier, have 
failed without the final, crucial step: the 
plea for fairness. That plea, as I argued 
originally, has not been shown to be concep-
tually ooherent in the context of Wreen's 
argument. It is also irredeemably circular. 
I will now explain why Wreen's responses to 
these charges leave his argument for species-
ism unsalvaged. 
Anyone who reads Wreen's (1)-(4) can see 
that (4), his oonclusion, needs explanation 
and defense. Wreen, of oourse, is well aware 
of this and offers us both. According to 
(4) : 
Hurran non-persons, then, should be 
ascribed basic rights; for although 
in the primary case it is persons 
who are ascribed basic rights, 
equality of opporttmity, or, bet-
ter, fairness, requires us to 
ascribe basic rights to hum':lJ1 non-
persons as well. (WI: p. 52) 
Since (4) is a normative claim, it does not 
follow from the non-nonnative (1-3). What 
separate grounds are we given for believing 
that "fairness" justifies the ascription of 
basic rights to human non-persons but not to 
non-human non-persons belonging to species 
uncharacterized by personhood? These humans, 
we are told, have been deprived of their 
personhood by "Natural contingency" or laws 
of nature beyond their oontrol. They have 
been "denied" a chance at beeaning or renain-
ing a person by "foul fortune." Nature has 
been unjust, inequitable, unfair. It is the 
cause of their non-personhood. According 
these individuals basic rights is "canpensa-
tion" or "restitution" for the initial injus-
tice. [10] To quote frau Wreen I s defense of 
(4): 
What I argue, in part, is that when 
nature--Iaws of nature and Natural 
Contingency-denies a hum:m being 
the usual qualifications for pos-
sessing basic rights, namely per-
sonhood, basic morality, perhaps 
natural law, makes due restitution 
for such a fundamental injustice. • 
Put somewhat differenUy--ahd 
certainly extravaganUy--it would 
be appropriate to ask the Supreme 
Court of Justice of the Cosmos for 
adequate canpensation for having 
been denied personhood. (WI: pp. 
55-56) 
This defense of (4) personifies nature by 
implying that pure chance or natural law can 
inflict injustice, deny opportunities, and 
provide "compensation" or "restitution." 
Here is another apt quote fran his defense: 
Basic morality, perhaps natural 
law, ensures at least the ITUnlIClUm 
of fairness here, and redresses the 
moral balance, makes up for na-
ture 's inhumanity to humanity, by 
according basic rights. (WI: p. 53) 
But only moral agents--perhaps-can inflict 
injustice, provide restitution, ensure the 
minimum of fairness. The terms "Natural 
Contingency, " "natural law," "the cosmos," 
and "nature" do not designate a moral agent. 
So isn't Wreen' s oonceptual framework concep-
tually inooherent? 
Wreen replies (after rcus~ng this objec-
tion himself) that terms like '''Justice,' 
'restitution,' and 'canpensation' are handy 
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metaI;i1ors, just as 'accord basic rights' 
is. • • The anthropc.uorI;i1ism is not inex-
tirpable, just convenient and vivid" (WI: p. 
57) • [11 l I replied that I would like to see 
how these metaI;i1ors could be extirpated fran 
the defense of (4). He resp::mds that "the 
showing in question is easy enough, though: 
just read "In Defense of Speciesism" ~ the 
phrases in question--or read this paper as it 
stands" (WII: p. 27). 
The trouble is that eliminating these 
phrases fran "In Defense of Speciesism" 
leaves Wreen with no argument. Wreen's stage 
(4) --the conclusion of his argument for spe-
ciesism--itself contains these "metaphors." 
This also holds for "My Kind of Person, " 
which repeats the conclusion (although it 
eliminates the defense for it). If "justice" 
is merely a convenient metaI;i1or here, so is 
"fairness." As nature, not other persons, is 
clearly the culprit in (4) (see 2-3), the 
objectionable personification continues. A 
genuine extirpation ~ eliminates Wreen' s 
conclusion. 
If that weren't problema.tic enough, the 
fatal flaw of circularity remains. I had 
argued that Wreen' s defense of speciesism is 
circular as follows. By maintaining that we 
should accord basic rights to human non-
persons because they had been unfairly de-
prived of the personhood which is character-
istic of their species, Wreen assumes that 
they already have ~ basic right: the right 
to be treated justly or fairly. (The terms 
"compensation" and "restitution" make this 
especially clear.) Wreen responds by distin-
guishing "justic~ (or fairness or equality)" 
as ~ right fran "justice (or fairness or 
a;rua1.ity) " as ~ principle. The principle 
grounds the right, he says. JusticE;, ~ ~ 
right is not used in the argument for spe-
ciesism, Wreen tells us; justice as ~ princi-
~ is. The principle of equality is applied 
to human non-persons in the argument, thus 
grounding their basic right to justice. It 
is not, then, presupposed that human non-
persons already have basic rights. In this 
way, Wreen argues, "the circle can be, and 
is, broken" (WII: p. 27). What is the prin-
ciple of "justice (or fairness or equality)"? 
We are told that "all creatures in the relev-
.,
, 
ant (person-related) class are to be treated 
fairly and equally in respect to personhood 
generated rights" (WII: p. 27). 
This rrove does not enable Wreen to es-
cape the charge of circularity; instead, it 
changes the circle's location. The basic 
question at issue is whether species member-
ship can be ~ rrorally relevant characteris-
tic. Feinberg's version of speciesism, the 
view which Feinberg rejects and which Wreen 
believes that he has established by his argu-
ment, is as follows: 
(FS) [Feinberg's version of spe-
ciesisml: A live creature's be-
longing to ~ species, not necessa-
rily our own, which is generally 
characterized by personhood, is of 
~ rroral weight, and enough, in 
fact, to ascribe a right to life to 
that creature. (WI: p. 48) 
Wreen cannot use his principle of justice to 
establish (FS). To suppose, as Wreen does, 
that the principle that "all creatures in the 
relevant (person-related) class are to be 
treated fairly and equally in respect to 
personhood generated rights" applies to human 
non-persons is to presuppose that membership 
in a species characterized by personhood has 
rroral weight. Not only is the circle not 
broken; it has tightened into a noose for the 
argument. 
For this reason, and many rrore, species-
ism has not been justified. If human non-
persons have basic rights-as I believe they 
do-- we would do well to look beyond their 
humanity for the source of these rights. In 
doing this, we will learn that non-humans--
whether or not they belong to personhood-
characterized species--have basic rights, 
too. 
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4. My only objection here was that it  
is often the case that hUlMl1s do have control 
over circumstances which would turn them into 
non-persons (P. 126) • Wreen concedes this 
(WII: p. 27). We continue to disagree about 
t;p.e ethical consequences of this fact, how-
ever. See note 10 below. 
5. Wreen is much less tentative about 
the role of (IP) in the conceptual stage of 
his argument in his response tha.."'1 he was in 
his original article. Compare WI: pp. 49-50 
with WII: pp. 24-5. See also my P. 128, n.  
7. Note, however, that (IP) implies nothing 
one way or the other about the existence of 
non-human species c,aracterized by person-
hood. The fact of the matter is that since 
"cOlTUlOnsense personhood" is not defined bio-
logically (as Wreen himself notes on p. 47),  
non-hUlMl1 persons could and-if recent work 
in ethology is correct--probably do exist  
(see my p. 127). (IP) as stated is entirely 
compatible with this fact.  
6. My abbreviation, Wreen's term. See 
WI: p. 50 and NIl: p. 24. 
7. Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Tom 
Regan, ed., Matt~s.. of Life and Death (New 
York.: Random House, 1980), p. 189. 
8. Sidney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and 
Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 4.  
9. Wreen adamantly rejects my interpre-
tation of his "X identifies with Y." He now 
says that he was not talking about "psycholo-
gical identification" (of which empathy is a 
form, according to all the psychologists I 
have seen who write on this subject) at all 
(\'lII: p. 26). If wreen is offering a new 
definition of a standard psychological term, 
should he not have said so? As it stands, 
the way "X identifies with Y" is used in his 
paper suggests the usual psychological inter-
pretation. One thinks "that could have been 
(or could be) me," as he repeatedly tells us. 
If what he intended to refer to is not psy-
chological identification, why use the first 
person this way? It now seems that he wants 
to make a rnetafX:iysical point here instead: I 
identify with Y if it really could have been 
me, not when I merely think "it could have 
been me." (Frankly, to use the p-u-ase "iden-
tify with" instead of, say, "be identifiable 
with," in making a metafX:iysical point rather 
than a psychological one, seems very odd 
indeed.) Even if this is what Wreen means, 
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however, I still must question his claim that 
we cannot identify with non-humans. He tells 
us: 
All I mean is that the COlTUlOn judgment 
"That could be me" holds for all hUlMl1 
beings, whether persons or not, that it 
doesn't for non-human non-persons. (WI: 
ibid. ) 
Why doesn't it hold for non-humans? If 
"could" have been born with 47 chrOIlOsones, 
why not with 46. Why "could" I have been a 
Down's child but not a chimpanzee with the 
same mental capacity as a Down's child? In 
either case, I would have been enmeshed in 
alternative causal series. 
I find the remarks Wreen makes on the 
distinction between his sense of identifica-
tion and empathy baffling. E.g., he cla~~ 
(WI: p. 49) that his brain-damaged Walter 
Weber identifies with humans "that have no 
inner life, or a radically diminished one" 
(WII: ibid.). Does Walter Weber think "it 
could be me" when he contemplates another 
brain-damaged human? How so? Another puz-
zle: Wreen says that the Weber-type identi-
fication with certain humans was part of his 
point in introoucing his three cases of human 
non-personhood (Weber is one of those (".ases). 
"I am not surePluhar quite w1derstood this," 
he remarks (WII: n. 4). That's absolutely 
true and not a bit surprising, given that 
nothing of the sort was said--we were to 
identify with WebeJ:--and I readily admit that 
I still don't understand. Agi3in, Wreen de-
nies that empathy with (as opposed to identi-
fication with) the severely brain-damaged or 
permanently insane is "rationally" possible, 
but he says that he can empathize with birds 
and antelope (WII: ibid.). But even if these 
humans were irreversibly comatose (a strange 
kind of congenital retardation or permanent 
insanity! ) , we can still put ourselves in 
their positions. Even if sentience on the 
part of the other individual were required 
for empathy, however, this in no way shows 
that we could empathize with birds but not 
with, say, Alzheimer's victims. 
In short, whatever "X identified with 
Y" is supposed to mean, without (IP) 's "qua-
si-metafX:iysical underpinning," it caTJIlot be 
used to support speciesism. 
10. Of course, this only applies to non-
persons who have not been responsible for 
their own condition through intention or 
negligence (such as non-persons who were 
Hollywood stunt people, who didn't wear their 
seat-belts, or who botchErl their suicide 
attempts). This doesn't bother Wreen. In 
response to my having pointed out that "at 
most Wreen has made a case for the ascription 
of basic rights to those human non-persons 
whose condition is no fault of their own" (p. 
126). (The first two words are ernmasizErl 
because they were inadvertently omitted from 
Wreen's quotation in his response.) Wreen 
replies that it would be consistent with his 
position to hold that such non-persons have 
forfeited their right to life (WII: p. 26-7). 
I continue to find this counter-intuitive, 
but the reader must check his/her own intui-
tions on this point. 
11. In this context, Wreen also claims 
that such terms "are used metamorically by 
all those who reject (88) [Singer's "species-
ism"] and (FS) and, in fact, by everyone who 
employs the concept of a basic right at all" 
(WI: p. 57). However, (1) Why must a propon-
ent of basic rights personify change or na-
tural law? Only moral agents are capable of 
respecting or violating basic rights. (2) 
Rejectors of speciesism who endorse the no-
tion of basic rights also have no need thus 
to personify nature. In reiterating his 
"you, too" charge in "My Kind of Person, " 
Wreen actually makes a very different charge: 
he claims that anti-speciesists who accord 
moral considerability to non-humans anthropo-
morphize these non-humans. Why? By applying 
terms (moral and psychological) for which the 
adult human is the m:x:l.el to those who are 
non-human. In doing this, anti-speciesists 
use the terms in a "metamorical" or "deriva-
tive" sense (WII: n. 6). In response, I 
first want to point out that this would be a 
very different sort of metamorizing from 
that which Wreen has been chargErl with doing. 
Second, to say that any application of psy-
chological or moral terms to non-humans is 
anthrofXXllOrfhism is to say that it is cogni-
tively unjustifiErl. But why should one ac-
cept this allegation? Even if "Wittgenstein 
has taught us" that the adult human is the 
model for all psychological and moral ascrip-
tions (I happen to be one of those fhiloso-
. mers who have not been "taught" this by 
anybody, including Wittgenstein), it does not 
follow that the application of such terms to 
others is cognitively unjustified or meta-
morical. 8uppose that I learn the concept 
of box on the basis of my exposure to cigar 
boxes. Do I "cigarboximorphize" if, later in 
life, I classify music boxes as boxes? Is 
this a cognitively unjustified ascription? 




lImong the many ways in which human 
beings differ from animals, two are especial-
ly evident in philosomic debate. I'm not 
talking about rationality here; the rather 
hard to understand objections of a few aside, 
rationality is so evident as not to merit 
mention. No, I'm referring, first, to the 
inability of a milosomer to entertain a 
doubt that anything he/she ever wrote is or 
could be wrong, and, second, his/her willing-
ness to defend unto the death, in the form of 
replies and counter-replies, every single 
word he/she's ever cOllIllitted to the page. 
Evelyn Pluhar and I, I am afraid, are very 
much cases in point. Here we are, going at 
it again, this being the second journal and 
the fifth article in the series. Maybe, if 
we're lucky, we can sell the whole thing as a 
television serial. 
But let me get down to business now, in 
an effort to keep round five as short as 
possible. 
The story so far has been: I write "In 
Defense of 8peciesism," [1] arguing that all 
creatures belonging to a species character-
ized by personhood have a right to life--
basically, all human beings have a right to 
life~ Pluhar responds in "Speciesism Not 
Justified, " [2 ] arguing that my arcJument is 
defective on many counts; I reply in "My Kind 
of Person, " [3 ] arguing that Pluhar' s criti-
cisms won't do; Pluhar does not take this 
lying down but responds yet again in· "Spe-
ciesism Revisited, "[4] defending her earlier 
objections against my counter-arguments. 
That brings us up to the present. In 
this paper, I won't be recapitUlating any 
DISCUSSION 
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